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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
End of a mandate -- chronology and analysis 
The current crisis in the Russian government has been evolving throughout the 
summer. As the Kirienko government struggled to stabilize the ruble, collect 
taxes, and resolve a series of payment crises, President Yel'tsin attempted to 
reassert his authority through a familiar routine of attack, withdrawal and 
compromise. 
 
In June and early July, Yel'tsin insisted the Duma enact the government's 
economic stabilization package, which was required by the IMF for its multi-
million dollar bailout. The president demonstrated his resolve for following this 
economic course by announcing his intention to use his power of decree to enact 
the program if the Duma failed to act. Tacit in this announcement was a threat to 
dissolve the Duma, should the legislators prove recalcitrant.  
 
As parliamentarians debated the economic measures, coup rumors saturated the 
Russian media, fueled in part by Yel'tsin's own statements of preparedness to 
handle a coup attempt and by his actions, such as the promotion of senior 
security officials (Stepashin, Krapivin, and Kuznetsov). 
 
By the middle of July, a scenario very much like what came to pass in August 
was likely discussed as Yel'tsin held meetings with former Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and senior faction representatives from the Duma. During the 
meeting with Duma members, Yel'tsin was claimed to have insisted that 
dissolution of the Duma or impeachment of the president were "inadmissible" 
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options. For his part, Chernomyrdin left the Kremlin meeting denying he would 
return to the government and calling for compromise among the factions. 
 
A form of compromise was evident in the unheralded appointment of Communist 
deputy Yuri Maslyukov as Minister of Trade and Industry on 23 July. This may 
have been a goodwill gesture on the part of the executive, or perhaps it was 
believed the addition of Maslyukov would weaken the Duma Communists' 
opposition to the government's economic plan. The Communists' lukewarm 
reaction to the appointment, as well as subsequent events, suggest that this 
move was interpreted as a sign of weakness in the president. 
 
President Yel'tsin, with little credible evidence of economic or political 
stabilization, left the capital for a previously scheduled vacation. His two 
interruptions of that vacation were disconcerting. 
 
On 25 July, Prime Minister Kirienko met with Yel'tsin on vacation in Karelia, after 
which Yel'tsin told the media that personnel changes had been made. 
Subsequently, the replacement of FSB Chief Kovalev with a deputy chief of the 
president's staff, Vladmir Putin, was announced. Within days, Yel'tsin departed 
Karelia for his Gorki-9 residence, to resolve "urgent matters" regarding the 
political situation. Whether or not Kovalev's dismissal was politically motivated, 
Yel'tsin's actions left an unmistakable sense of unease. 
 
The second interruption of Yel'tsin's vacation reads now like a desperate last-
ditch effort to influence investor confidence in the ruble. On 14 August, Yel'tsin 
announced, certainly at the prompting of government advisers, that there would 
be no devaluation of the ruble. He would not cut short his vacation, he told 
reporters, because that would signal that "things are in a real mess." Instead, he 
wanted to send the message that "everything's going the way it ought to." 
(Interfax, 0716 GMT, 14 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-226) 
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Within two days, Kirienko and Anatoli Chubais met with Yel'tsin to inform him that 
devaluation was inevitable. Chubais, who apparently mistakenly believed he had 
IMF support for devaluation, convinced Yel'tsin to support the measure. (See The 
Washington Post, 23 Aug 98, p. A21 for more on the Chubais-IMF negotiation.) 
 
Presidential adviser Alexander Livshits, who was a vocal opponent of 
devaluation, was dismissed after the devaluation was announced in mid-August. 
The confusion and unrest surrounding the nosediving currency, however, 
suggested that Livshits would not be the only victim of devaluation. 
 
On 17 August, Chernomyrdin interrupted his vacation and returned to Moscow. 
Within the next several days, Chernomyrdin held consultations with most of 
Russia's leading politicians (Moscow Mayor Luzhkov is a notable exception). 
 
By the time President Yel'tsin "shocked the West" with his dismissal of the 
Kirienko government on 23 August , it seemed clear that Chernomyrdin believed 
he had worked out a deal with Duma representatives to ensure his own smooth 
return to power. The general details of the agreement, which was presented to 
President Yel'tsin for signature on 30 August, were likely negotiated by 
Chernomyrdin in his earlier meetings. 
 
Whether Yel'tsin initiated Chernomyrdin's return, or whether he was presented 
with a fait accompli, has become largely irrelevant, as Chernomyrdin's 
resurrection itself has been postponed by Duma leaders. Sensing a dramatic 
shift in the balance of power between the executive and legislature, the Duma, 
led in this maneuver by Gennadi Zyuganov, is increasing its demands before 
approving Chernomyrdin's appointment. 
 
Chernomyrdin certainly sees a double cross in this latest move. "We got all the 
consent," he is quoted as remarking, "and all of a sudden everything is 
destroyed." (New York Times, International Section, 1 Sep 98; nytimes.com) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Ray Gaul 
 
Government change not to affect foreign policy? 
Sources in the Russian foreign ministry told Interfax on 24 August that the most 
recent government reshuffle in Moscow will not lead to changes in Russia's 
foreign policy, reiterating that foreign policy is shaped by the president, a phrase 
often used by acting Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov. Primakov, who recently 
returned to Moscow from vacation, expressed optimism with regards to his 
position in the new government. He also stated that, although the current 
domestic problems will "doubtless weaken us," the active foreign policy agenda 
of the next few months should prove that "Russia is still perceived as a major 
player on the international arena." He highlighted the Russian-American summit, 
set for the beginning of September, and the recent visit of Bulgarian President 
Pyotr Stoyanov to Moscow as evidence of Russia's important role in the 
international community. Primakov went further to state that "Russia's foreign 
policy must be more active now that it is going through economic difficulties." 
(Interfax, 0709 GMT, 24 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-236, and Interfax, 1009 GMT, 27 
Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-239) 
 
Weapons-for-diamonds deal announced 
The director of the Russian defense ministry's Main Department for International 
Cooperation, Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, told Interfax on 20 August that an 
agreement was reached between Angola and Russia concerning the 
modernization of the Angolan armed forces. A Russian delegation to Luanda, 
headed by Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, reached preliminary agreement 
concerning a special five-year program. Work on the specifics of the agreement 
will begin in about a month, Ivashov said. 
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The Angolan armed forces, which were almost exclusively supplied by the Soviet 
Union during the Angolan civil war in the 1970s and '80s, are in a state of 
disrepair. Ivashov said that the mostly Soviet-produced arms need to be repaired 
or replaced; a proposed program envisages a detailed analysis of Angola's 
armaments, creation of Russian-Angolan joint ventures for repairs on military 
equipment, and replacement of outdated arms with modern Russian military 
equipment. 
 
Ivashov at the same time pointed out that "the program will work only if the 
necessary financing is provided." He said that, taking into account the present 
economic situation in Russia, Angola can hardly count on obtaining a Russian 
loan or receiving Russian arms for free. The agenda for Russian-Angolan talks in 
Luanda included possible expansion of Russia's participation in the development 
of diamond fields in Angola and diamond sales and a proposal that a certain 
amount of Angolan oil be sold via Russian firms. 
 
Ignoring the role that Soviet weapons and troops played during the Angolan Civil 
War and in an apparent attempt to separate "business" from foreign policy, 
Sergeev noted that the situation in Angola "may only be stabilized by peaceful 
means," and "(the) development of the armed forces should serve peace and 
stability in Angola rather than war." (Interfax, 1547 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-UMA-
98-234) 
 
Russia supports Belgrade's proposals, sends troops to Albania 
Russia welcomed Belgrade's decision to restore dialogue with the recently 
established delegation of ethnic Albanian political parties in the Kosovo-Metohija 
province of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia as soon as possible. Foreign ministry 
spokesman Valeri Nesterushkin stated during a regular press briefing on 18 
August that Moscow supports Belgrade's intention to renew political talks with 
ethnic Albanian representatives. Nesterushkin also said that Russia welcomed 
the establishment of a new ethnic Albanian negotiating team, named by ethnic 
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Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, but did not comment on the team's refusal to 
respond to the invitation. (Tanjug, 2011 GMT, 18 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-230) 
 
However, on the heels of these comments, in what initially appeared to be a 
departure from Moscow's previous statements concerning military exercises in 
Albania, Nesterushkin highlighted a Russian platoon's participation in a NATO-
sponsored exercise in Albania. In an apparent attempt to diffuse any domestic 
opposition or perceptions from Belgrade as to Russian participation in the NATO-
sponsored Cooperative Assembly exercise, Nesterushkin emphasized the 
humanitarian objective of the operation. He stated that "contrary to certain claims 
(it) has strictly humanitarian goals of giving help to the population, monitoring the 
border, patrolling the roads, and setting up roadblocks, with a stress being laid on 
teaching the Albanian Army how to act in such situations." He went further to say 
that "any attempts to link the exercise and our part in it with some kind of threat 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are groundless."(ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1101 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-232) 
 
Moscow warns of Afghan terrorism, opposes US missile strikes 
Less then a week before US cruise missiles struck suspected terrorist targets in 
Afghanistan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov stated that 
Afghanistan "may turn into yet another seat of international terrorism." Although 
Pastukhov's comments were aimed at condemning alleged Pakistani aid to the 
Taliban in their war against the northern alliance, his comments also addressed 
the location of suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan. During a press briefing 
on 13 August he stated that "one may suppose that the organizers of several 
terrorist acts staged worldwide in the past few days were sheltered in Kandahar, 
a city in southern Afghanistan, which has became the center of the Taliban 
movement." (Interfax, 0924 GMT, 13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) 
 
Although many in Moscow were aware of the location of terrorist camps in 
Afghanistan and apparent Taliban support of terrorist activity, that knowledge had 
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little impact on the official Kremlin reaction to the US missile strike against the 
suspected terrorist targets. A foreign ministry response to the US strikes stated 
that the action "cannot but cause serious worries," and "does not bring the 
eradication of terrorism any closer, but may create a dangerous precedent of 
resolving international disputes in this way, thus undermining the legal framework 
of international relations." The foreign ministry statement also claimed that "in 
effect, while it does not address the essence of the problem, such action can 
trigger a chain reaction whose consequences cannot be predicted." (Interfax, 
1058 GMT, 21 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-233) 
 
However there was some disagreement to the official line heard in Moscow. 
During a radio broadcast, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, now 
a deputy in the State Duma, said the action taken by the United States was 
appropriate. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 21 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-233) 
 
Events slow momentum in Asian relations 
The burgeoning financial crises in Japan and Russia forced government shake-
ups in the months of July and August and may have delayed progress on 
resolution of outstanding issues and the strengthening of ties which had gained 
significant momentum in recent months. Additionally, flooding and internal 
disorder in China have derailed a scheduled visit by President Jiang Zemin. 
Russia's diplomatic row with South Korea over embassy expulsions due to 
espionage have further foiled Russia's efforts to develop better ties with the East. 
 
Of late, Russia had truly made an about-face in its approach to issues 
concerning the Far East. Diplomacy between Moscow and the East began to 
occur on a more frequent basis and took on a more urgent tone. The long-
standing conflict over the demarcation of the border between Russia and China 
was resolved this year and President Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime Minister 
Hashimoto appeared to have developed a relationship which would allow for 
resolution over the Kurile islands by the year 2000. 
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Although Japanese and Russian spokespersons have stated that the resignation 
of Prime Minister Hashimoto in early July and the sacking of Prime Minister 
Kirienko in August will not disrupt efforts to piece together an agreement over a 
so-called "peace treaty" absent from bilateral relations since World War II, the 
reality is that bilateral relations have sustained a severe setback. Most 
importantly, Hashimoto, for many, represented the driving force in Russo-
Japanese reconciliation. Without his symbolic presence, the goal of achieving a 
finalized agreement by 2000 seems unlikely. While Hashimoto's private trip to 
Russia symbolizes Japan's continued desire to remain on pace, political realities 
may soon disrupt matters. 
 
Moreover, while Jiang's decision to postpone his "meeting without jackets" trip to 
Russia may appear to have been motivated by domestic forces, clearly the 
recent turmoil in Russia's government played a role in China's decision. This 
delay poses an opportunity for China to get a firmer idea of how Russia's 
government will adjust in the wake of the financial turmoil and political instability 
and at the same time creates discontinuity in the diplomatic arena. 
 
Last word on diplomatic row with Korea? 
In July, a series of diplomatic expulsions occurred after Moscow's decision to 
eject a South Korean intelligence agent from its embassy. Since then, the South 
Korean foreign minister has been replaced and meetings have been postponed. 
The incident, while initially described as minor, snowballed to the point of 
permanently disrupting Russo-Korean rapprochement. The two sides had made 
steady progress on economic issues and had gained confidence in their ability to 
work constructively on disagreements. Now, however, miscommunication and 
hostile responses have marred that confidence. When Russian Foreign Minister 
Primakov refused to shake hands with his South Korean counterpart at an 
ASEAN forum in Manila, it became clear that the states could only remedy the 
situation through the effective combination of applying concerted effort and 
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allowing time to pass. With luck, South Korea's dismissal of late will be the final 
word on the problematic turn of events. Without a dialogue between Russia and 
South Korea, an overall peace settlement for the Korean peninsula becomes 
more unlikely. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 Aug 98, p. 7; FBIS-SOV-98-232) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Jailed Nizhny Novgorod mayor registered for city election 
Andrei Klimentev, currently in a labor penitentiary, has been registered as a 
candidate for mayor of Nizhny Novgorod for the upcoming 27 September 
elections. Klimentev won the mayoral election last March, but the results were 
invalidated by the Electoral Commission and he was jailed for a supposed 
misappropriation of funds from the Navashinsky shipyard. 
 
When asked how the Election Commission could allow Klimentev's mayoral 
candidacy, Chairman Sergei Rodin said that, until the Supreme Court ruled on 
the case, Klimentev could not be barred from running for office. The Supreme 
Court is supposed to hear the case this Fall. 
 
Most of the citizens of the city believe that Klimentev was jailed and his victory 
ruled invalid because of pressure from the Kremlin. It is certainly no secret that 
he has been on the losing side of a battle with ex-governor, and now ex-
presidential aide, Boris Nemtsov. But with Nemtsov's dismissal, Klimentev's 
future mayoral prospects may have indeed brightened considerably -- barring an 
adverse ruling by the Supreme Court. (ITAR-TASS, 1313 GMT, 29 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-210) 
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POLITICAL PARTIES 
Communist Party factions emerging 
Leaders of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) are finally 
admitting what has been apparent for months now. Factions are emerging within 
the party which may prove to be its undoing. Coming on the heals of the painful 
Kirenko nomination and the voting split into Seleznev and Zyuganov camps, the 
recent independent behavior of former Duma member Yuri Dmitrievich 
Maslyukov has shown the party's lack of internal order. 
 
Maslyukov (CPRF) was asked by Kirenko to join the government, but the party 
said he was not allowed. Maslyukov ignored the commands of the party and 
joined the now defunct Kirienko government. The CPRF has yet to decide if it will 
expel Maslyukov. 
 
The two camps emerging within the party are the "Gorbachevite conciliationists," 
and those aged largely between 50 and 60 who found themselves out of a job 
after August 1991. The latter refuse to cooperate with Yel'tsin under any 
circumstances. The "conciliationists" are the younger comrades who are more 
willing to accept the legitimacy of the Yel'tsin regime and hope to partake in the 
division of spoils. 
 
An additional problem for the monolithical nature of the CPRF is that with the 
amorphous and highly changeable nature of Russian politics, party discipline is 
seen by many members to hinder not only their personal political fortunes, but 
those of the party as well. For this reason, Maslyukov was able to ignore the 
instructions of his party -- and not be immediately expelled. There is clearly a 
feeling within the CPRF that in order to effect change, the party may need to 
work with the government. What this means for the party is unclear, but if history 
is any guide, the party faithful and the party politiques will not be able to live 
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under the same roof for very long. (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1 Aug 98, p. 2; FBIS-
SOV-98-220) 
 
FEDERATION COUNCIL 
Duma impeachment commission invites Gorbachev to testify 
The commission has asked former USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev to testify 
with regard to the particulars of the Belovezhye Agreements, which dissolved the 
Soviet Union. Also asked to testify were (former Ukrainian president) Leonid 
Kravchuk and (ex-president of Belarus) Stanislav Shushkevich. 
 
One, if not the main, charge against Boris Yel'tsin has been the engineering of 
the Soviet Union's dissolution and the communists' wish to prove that Yel'tsin's 
participation in the breakup of the USSR was treasonous. It is unclear, of course, 
with what authority the current Duma, itself a creation of a constitution ratified 
subsequent to the constitution under which Yel'tsin was supposed to have 
committed his crime, can try its case. But given Yel'tsin's latest shenanigans, 
who knows? (ITAR-TASS, 1120 GMT, 17 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-229) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon 
 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev "informally" met with his German counterpart 
Volker Ruehe in the Black Sea resort of Sochi 20-21 July. The framework of the 
meeting was bilateral military cooperation, the defense ministry press service 
said. During the meeting, the two ministers were to discuss prospects for building 
a European military transport plane designed on the pattern of the Russian-
Ukrainian AN-70, cooperation between the navies of both countries, problems 
experienced in running a MIG-29 plane and training military personnel at higher 
educational establishments in Russia and Germany. (ITAR-TASS, 1322 GMT, 17 
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-198) The two-day informal meeting ended with a news 
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conference at Sochi's Adler Airport on 21 July. In the opinion of the German 
minister, the meeting was fruitful and bilateral military cooperation is developing 
successfully. This includes the future cargo plane project on which experts of the 
two countries have been working. Their conclusions are expected by late 
September. The cooperation program for next year includes a joint paratrooper 
drill and a joint arrangement of the two navies in the Baltic Sea, the minister said. 
He noted this "no-tie" meeting would be followed by an invitation to Marshal 
Sergeev to visit Germany. (ITAR-TASS, 1802 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
202) If final design and performance of the transport aircraft prove far superior to 
existing, aging airframes in the European theater, follow-on production and sale 
could provide a long-term boost to Russia's crippled economy. 
 
On a related note, Lieutenant General Yuri Klishin, deputy commander-in-chief of 
the Russian Air Force in charge of Air Force armament, said that the decision 
taken by Russia and Ukraine on beginning the production of the AN-70 military-
transport plane does not depend on whether a consortium of West European 
countries joins the program. "We continued, are continuing, and shall continue to 
create the AN-70 plane by ourselves and shall bring the program to the end 
irrespective of whether or not it will be approved as an all-European program of 
the creation of an up-to-date transport plane," he said. Along with the 
continuation of military flight trials, preparations for starting mass production of 
AN-70 planes are going on in Kyiv and Samara. It has been decided to produce 
an experimental batch of ten AN-70 planes and 50 turbojet engines for them. The 
production of AN-70 planes will begin in 1999 in Kyiv and in 2000 in Samara. The 
two countries will produce the engines simultaneously in equal numbers. The 
demand for AN-70s in the CIS member states is estimated at 600 planes, of 
which 150 will be purchased by the Russian Air Force, Klishin said. Another 300 
planes may be sold on the world market, including Middle East countries, he 
added. These aircraft will be used to replace aging military-transport aviation -- 
IL-76s, AN-12s and AN-124s. (ITAR-TASS, 0909 GMT, 7 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
219) 
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And for a limited time, we'll throw in a carrier -- cheap!  
Indian naval experts are thinking "thoroughly and in detail" about buying the 
Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, ITAR-TASS was told by a source 
close to the Indian defense ministry. "India is interested in buying the Russian 
aircraft carrier to meet its defense requirements but the issue has to be given 
thorough and unhurried consideration," the source said. First of all, the Indians 
have to calculate how much alteration the ship will need for it to become an 
integrated part of their country's defenses and also how it will be able to serve 
"defense and deterrence purposes" in the coming years. Second, there is the 
financial side of the equation. "India's experts are inclined to buy if Russia, in the 
spirit of friendship and strategic partnership, offers a good deal for the ship, 
which it does not really need any more," the source said. India plans to buy S-
300 mobile air-defense systems, Su-30MK multi-role fighters, MIG-27 fighters, T-
72 tanks, three frigates, and a submarine as part of a long-term military 
partnership agreement with Russia set to run until the year 2010. (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 0622 GMT, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-201) Russian President 
Boris Yel'tsin's planned visit to India this December is expected to result in the 
signing of an agreement on bilateral defense cooperation and arms trade through 
to the year 2010, according to Indian Ambassador Ranendra Sena, who 
addressed a news conference in Moscow on 23 July. Russia is the only country 
with which India has such long-term cooperation in the military sphere and India 
is also Russia's longest-lasting partner in defense cooperation, he said. Russian-
Indian defense cooperation is based not only on economic issues but also on 
converging views on security, stability, transparency and respect for reciprocal 
obligations, Sena said. (Interfax, 1150 GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) 
 
Broadening the horizons 
The Novosibirsk aircraft production association, which used to build military 
aircraft, has carried out its first conversion order. It produced three AN-38 aircraft 
for local consumption (Vostok air company in Khabarovsk). The aircraft has a 
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high technological capability: 20,000 hours of flight time, 30,000 landings, and a 
service life of 15 years. Moreover, the aircraft can take off from an unsurfaced 
runway of just 300 meters. The Almazy Rossii-Sakha and Chukotavia air 
companies have ordered five aircraft each, and a pre-contract agreement for the 
sale of 45 aircraft has been concluded with India. The company hopes to obtain a 
special certificate that will allow it to gain access to markets in Angola, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, and other countries. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0654 GMT, 19 Jul 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-200) With defense contracts bottomed out, aircraft and 
shipbuilding companies must continue to explore other production and sales 
opportunities to stay in business and for Russia to maintain its military-industrial 
base potential for future use. 
 
The Russian government is also doing its part to help the defense industry. 
President Yel'tsin has signed a "number of important decrees," including an edict 
reducing gas and electricity tariffs for industrial enterprises and budget-
dependent organizations by 50 percent. The president also signed a decree 
determining a "list of armaments for military and technical cooperation." 
According to then Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, this decree is of great 
importance for the country's defense industry, allowing it to "earn money not only 
through the (state) order but also through sales of armaments." (ITAR-TASS, 
1725 GMT, 25 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-206) 
 
If at first you don't succeed ... try to launch again 
June wasn't a very successful month for launching satellites in Russia, but July 
proved much better. On 16 June, six Russian military satellites were improperly 
launched by the Strategic Missile Troops (SMT) into incorrect orbits from the 
Plisetsk cosmodrome in northwestern Russia. Possible causes for the error were 
failure of one stage of the Tsiklon-3 booster or fuel problems. (ITAR-TASS, 1010 
GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) Fortunately, the satellites could be 
reprogrammed while in space and have since been moved to correct orbits. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1343 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182)  
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Six more satellites took four attempts and two-and-a-half weeks to achieve a 
successful launch from Baykonur launch center and reach their destinations. One 
Russian [Resur-0] satellite and five small foreign satellites were finally put in orbit 
with a Zenit-2 booster on 10 July following three false starts. The launch 
originally scheduled for 23 June, 24 June and 9 July, had to be delayed due first 
to malfunctions in the rocket, then to malfunctions in the automatic system 
controlling the launch. First-time customers of Russian launch service (Israel and 
Chile) and second-time users (Austria and Thailand) may look elsewhere if 
episodes like this continue. The Russian defense ministry satellite's reported 
function is environmental monitoring, weather tracking and natural 
resources.(ITAR-TASS, 0814 GMT, 8 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189, ITAR-TASS, 
0740 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190, and ITAR-TASS, 1050 GMT, 10 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-191) 
 
Strategic missile troops were successful in launching four other defense ministry 
satellites in June and July. On two consecutive days, 24 and 25 June, the SMT 
launched Kosmos series military satellites from the Plesetsk and Baykonur 
cosmodromes, respectively. Both satellites were carried into space with Soyuz-U 
boosters. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1421 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) 
On 1 July, the SMT successfully launched another Kosmos series military 
satellite from Plesetsk but this time with a Molniya-M. (ITAR-TASS, 1343 GMT, 1 
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182) Finally, proving that "one must quickly get back on the 
horse after falling off" to be successful, the SMT put a Kosmos series military 
satellite in the correct orbit on the first try from the Baykonur launch center with a 
Zenit-2 carrier rocket -- the same booster used in the "fourth time's a charm" 
launching on 10 July. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0940 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-209) 
 
Not to be outdone by the SMT, the crew of the Novomoskovsk, a nuclear missile-
carrying submarine in Russia's Northern Fleet, successfully launched a German 
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scientific satellite (Tubsat-N) from an underwater position in the Barents Sea on 7 
July. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0557 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) 
 
Errors, delays, and failures can and do happen in any space program. Look no 
further than explosions of the Challenger and recent military satellite launch for 
examples in the United States. Reasons for such problems can vary across the 
spectrum, from budget cutting, to technological shortcomings, to politics (i.e., 
rush to launch). Suffice it to say, that with the cost of booster rockets and 
satellites, mistakes can be very expensive. Also, maintaining the infrastructure 
needed to accomplish these launches is a constant drain on the defense budget 
in a time when every ruble counts. One possible way to reduce military costs is to 
"privatize" certain operations much like the US military is doing with housing for 
military members in some locations and utilities services. In these cases, the 
military pays for the service like those in the civil sector, rather than maintaining 
an organic capability. Conversely, allowing commercial activities to utilize 
military/government facilities on a cost-sharing basis (e.g., joint use of airfields, 
commercial satellite launches from Cape Canaveral, etc.) could defray some of 
the costs now borne by the Russian military. An example in Russia may be the 
Svobodny cosmodrome. Previously used to station an SMT division (1960-1994), 
it is now prepared to take on commercial launches into space. There were two 
successful launches in 1997 and more scheduled for 1998, but they have been 
pushed back due to foreign customer delays in satellite preparation. (ITAR-
TASS, 2122 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) With money tight and an 
increasing need to at least replace existing arrays (see Nezavisimoye voyennoye 
obozreniye, 22-28 May 98, No. 19, p. 4; FBIS-SOV-98-188), the Russian defense 
ministry may want to consider more actively soliciting commercial launches to 
help pay their space launch infrastructure overhead. 
 
Air Force reorganization almost complete ... or maybe not 
Air Force CINC Col-Gen Anatoly Kornukov stated recently that the reorganization 
merging the Air Force and Air Defense into a single service is 95 percent 
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complete and will be finished by October 1998. He said the main command, 
which officially stood up on 1 March 1998, has been staffed fully and functionally 
and that new Air Force-Air Defense units have started to perform their missions. 
He also mentioned that funding, or lack thereof, is still causing some problems in 
material and housing of dismissed servicemen. There is also a shortage in 
transportation assets required to take away armaments from the former 
locations. (ITAR-TASS, 1708 GMT, 11 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-223, and ITAR-
TASS, 1130 GMT, 16 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-228) 
 
Of course, if Strategic Missile Troops CINC Col-Gen Yakovlev has his say, the 
Air Force will be reorganizing again soon. Yakovlev suggested recently that top 
generals are considering merging the missile troops and Air Force into a single 
service. He said that the already completed merging of the military aerospace 
forces and anti-missile defense forces into a unified service has boosted combat 
effectiveness 18-20 percent and reduced the percentage of the defense ministry 
budget required for these functions from 19.3 percent to 15.5 percent. In his 
opinion, the new service could be created by the year 2002. (ITAR-TASS, 1708 
GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182) Col-Gen Kornukov, speaking in an interview 
on 22 Jun, responded to questions regarding a potential merger by saying, "This 
is up to the supreme command to decide (...) Perhaps there is some kind of 
expediency in this matter. The Defense Minister did say that, perhaps, we shall 
opt for a three-pronged system: ground, sea, and space and air." (NTV, 1540 
GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) It is an interesting concept and one that 
may deserve a bit more study some time in the future since there could be 
efficiencies gained through further consolidation. However, both organizations 
have recently undergone wholesale changes (for which the Air Force has yet to 
complete) and therefore, another major change in identity at this point may be 
premature and counterproductive. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
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By Ray Gaul 
 
Collective defense or collective rhetoric? 
In August, fighting within Afghanistan moved closer to the borders with Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Leaders in these countries feared that Taliban forces could 
breach the frontiers or could drive large numbers of refugees into CIS territory. 
Tajik President Rakhmanov called on other CIS countries to convene a special 
meeting of CIS defense ministers to discuss possible responses in the event that 
this occurs. While the Taliban does not appear to pose any direct threat to the 
CIS governments or military forces in the region, the possibility that the conflict 
could spill into Central Asia does raise several important questions for CIS 
countries. Most importantly, Rakhmanov's plea for help under the terms of the 
CIS collective security agreement creates uncertainty as to what obligations 
come with CIS membership and what situations constitute a credible threat to 
overall CIS security. 
 
Interestingly, responses to Rakhmanov's plea varied widely from country to 
country. Government sources in Russia pledged support, but comments made by 
Gennadi Zyuganov demonstrated a lack of unwavering commitment to collective 
security. Zyuganov stated, "The CIS was based on a single defense space, a 
single border, a single army, and a single security system. But they have failed to 
implement a single point of what they have signed! And now they have to 
convene urgently (on fortifying the Afghan border) -- but there is nobody to 
convene." (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 1017 GMT, 12 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
226) Kazakh Defense Minister Altymbaev indicated that Kazakhstan was less 
than enthusiastic about its involvement in the region when he said that the 
Taliban had promised not to violate the CIS border "because they are not 
claiming anybody's territory." (Interfax, 1418 GMT, 21 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
233) 
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Most telling was the response given by Belarus. President Lukashenka 
demonstrated that there are definite limits to the collective security agreement. 
His comments indicate what might have already appeared self-evident, namely 
that CIS governments would only become involved in situations that pose a direct 
threat to their own interests. Lukashenka stated that Belarus "will defend CIS 
interests in the west, from Kiev to Riga. But we won't be drawn into yet another 
peril, a frenzy over a Taliban invasion should not be built up." (Interfax, 1229 
GMT, 21 Aug 98; FBIS- SOV-98-233) With comments such as these, 
cooperation and consensus between CIS states will continue to take backseat to 
unconstrained grandstanding and rhetoric. 
 
Rumors of an informal meeting at Kuchma's birthday celebration 
Leaders from all over the former Soviet Union gathered to toast Ukrainian 
President Kuchma at his 60th birthday celebration in Crimea this month. In 
attendance were CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky, Victor 
Chernomyrdin, Russian Commisioner for the CIS Rybkin, and Azerbaijan 
President Aliev. CIS leaders allegedly convened in somewhat secretive fashion 
during the large gathering, further demonstrating Ukraine's desire to lead a 
coalition of governments opposed to Russia's dominance over CIS bodies and 
decision making. During a radio address, Georgian President Shevardnadze 
emphasized Ukraine's important role for Georgia and his hopes for continued 
good relations. He further indicated that the private talks were successful in 
achieving multilateral progress on CIS issues. The Kyiv-Tblisi relationship serves 
as the center of an alternative coalition aimed at evenly distributing power among 
CIS organs. (Iprinda, 1030 GMT, 10 Aug 98; FBIS- SOV-98-222) 
 
Berezovsky assesses CIS future after consultations 
CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky began the summer with the goal of 
speaking to each CIS president in hopes of learning where they stood on 
individual issues and of gaining a perspective on the overall CIS attitude towards 
cooperation. Initially, Berezovsky practiced shuttle diplomacy and garnered 
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support in efforts to hammer out agreements on Abkhazia and Nagorno-
Karabakh. He embarked on several trips to meet individually with CIS presidents 
and hear their concerns. Berezovsky also sought personal support from these 
leaders and worked to develop confidence in his ability to succeed in future 
endeavors. In doing so, he widened his political base to include a broader variety 
of well-wishers. 
 
While at the United Nations in New York, Berezovsky summarized his views on 
the future of the CIS based on his initial observations. As indicated by his 
actions, he believes that conflict settlement will continue to be the most important 
priority for the CIS. Given this assessment, it is likely that the CIS will grow 
increasingly involved in brokering conflict resolutions rather than more purely 
economic endeavors. While such efforts can certainly produce economic gains, 
the CIS will most certainly cross the thin line between playing neutral broker and 
active participant in ironing out disagreements within the commonwealth. 
 
Berezovsky's own words demonstrate his position most effectively. He states, "I 
am convinced that effective economic development is impossible when you have 
tensions generated by military conflicts or by the possibility of military clashes." 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 0014 GMT, 30 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-218) Even so, 
the secretary will surely face an uphill struggle in achieving success. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Monica Florescu 
 
UKRAINE 
IMF recommends $2.2 billion loan for stabilization reform 
Following a two-week visit of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, a 
recommendation for a $2.2 billion loan was made on 31 July. The loan will take 
the form of an Extended Finance Facility (EFF) over a period of three years, and 
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is meant to help support Ukraine's stabilization reform. In addition, the World 
Bank may provide Ukraine with funds for a second project aimed at financial 
sector reform, talks on which were suspended in mid-March 1998. The World 
Bank may also approve the second tranches of loans for restructuring the coal 
industry and the agricultural sector. In mid-June 1999 the cabinet and IMF 
experts are expected to work out a detailed plan on the "political foundation" for 
the second year of the IMF's EFF. (Interfax, 1159 GMT, 31 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
219) The mission's recommendation would be submitted to the IMF board of 
directors for approval at a session expected to take place after 24 August. If 
approved by the board, about $850 million from the $2.2 billion loan may arrive in 
Ukraine this year with a prompt tranche of $250 million. (ITAR-TASS, 1117 GMT, 
31 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-219) 
 
New border controls introduced 
As a result of an increase in the number of illegal migrants attempting to cross 
the Ukrainian border daily, Kyiv has decided to restrict the use of its territory and 
introduce a number of border controls. On 3 August, the Cabinet of Ministers 
identified the territory that is to be regulated (starting on 1 September), which 
includes some areas in the Crimean peninsula, in Kyiv and Odessa regions, in 
the city of Sevastopol and in 16 other regions. In addition, territorial sea waters, 
internal waters, a number of border rivers, lakes and islands are also control 
areas. A restricted access border zone will be established along the state land 
and water borders. (Interfax, 1215 GMT, 5 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-217) The 
director of the Border Troops press service, Serhiy Zhurets, said that the policy is 
not directed at Ukrainian residents but only at foreigners who, according to the 
newly implemented controls, must have the necessary documents allowing them 
to stay within the borders of the above-mentioned regions. (Intelnews, 2356 
GMT, 3 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-220) 
 
Impact of Russian crisis on the economy, relations with Russia viewed 
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On 18 August, Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko met with top finance and 
economics ministers, along with the National Bank chairman, to discuss the 
impact of the Russian financial crisis on Ukraine. (Interfax, 0923 GMT, 18 Aug 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-230) After the meeting, the chairman of the National Bank of 
Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, stated that the financial situations in Ukraine and 
Russia differ radically, and reassured the country that Russia's "withdrawal from 
the Ukrainian market will not cause any instability." The only worrisome 
consequence of the Russian financial crisis could be a decrease in revenues, as 
part of the Ukrainian assets have been frozen by Russian banks. (Interfax, 1024 
GMT, 19 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-231) Yushchenko said that the government and 
the National Bank have taken effective measures to "parry the financial situation 
in Russia." In addition, the government has been taking measures to review its 
export-import policies, and Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko ordered that the 
government "advance proposals to sustain the trade balance and optimize trade 
relations with Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1748 GMT, 19 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-231) 
 
On 20 August, the economics ministry submitted to the government a package of 
adjustment and prevention measures in the wake of the Russian ruble 
devaluation. The package included the recommendation to limit ruble circulation, 
and switch payments for goods and services from rubles to hard currencies. 
More drastic steps, including limiting trade with Russia, are to be taken in the 
event the ruble continues to fall. (Interfax, 1114 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
232) 
 
BELARUS 
Attempts made to settle the scandal over foreign envoy residences 
After talks were held between the foreign ministry and European Union 
representatives regarding the prolonged dispute over the eviction of foreign 
ambassadors from the Drozdy compound in early June, President Lukashenka 
offered a number of alternative options to the envoys. On 13 August, he visited 
several mansions in Minsk which he declared to be "as good as the ones in the 
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Drozdy complex" and offered them to the ambassadors who left. However, he 
asked them to search for residences on their own in case they found the 
buildings he offered to be unsatisfactory. Lukashenka said that envoys should 
pay as much as Belarusian officials pay for embassies in their countries. 
(Interfax, 1604 GMT, 13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) As of 15 August, Minsk was 
ready to offer over 20 mansions to ambassadors. In addition, on 20 August, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikaloy Buzo declared the possibility that the Drozdy 
estate could be divided in two parts: one containing the president's residences, 
and the other belonging to certain heads of diplomatic missions. (ITAR-TASS, 
1024 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-232) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Discussion held on Gazprom debt 
After a meeting between Moldovan officials, representatives from the Dniestr 
Republic, and members of the Board of Directors of the Russian Stock Society 
Gazprom held between 4 and 7 August in Chisinau, it was decided that Moldova 
will have to pay its current bill predominantly in cash. The debt to Gazprom now 
amounts to $595 million, of which $380 million is owed by the Dniestr region. 
This is more than Moldova owes to the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank combined. (ITAR-TASS, 1244 GMT, 7 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-219) 
The debt has grown because Russia has been refusing to accept goods and 
agricultural products as payment. In 1997, Gazprom agreed to accept a $140 
million package of bonds over a period of 7 years as payment for Moldova's debt. 
During the talks, Moldovan officials offered another package of bonds worth $90 
million with an interest rate of 7.5 percent and proposed shares in a joint venture 
with Gazprom, which would allow the founders to pay their debts with property. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1635 GMT, 5 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-217) The proposal was 
approved by Gazprom officials, and an agreement is expected to be signed in 
September. In the event that Moldova does not pay its current bill, Gazprom 
threatened to interrupt all gas supply to Moldova, after having already reduced it 
beginning on 1 July. 
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Exchange of territory agreement worked out with Ukraine 
On 5 August an agreement on border demarcation between Moldova and 
Ukraine was drawn up between prime ministers Ion Ciubic and Valeriy 
Pustovoytenko. The most important acquirement for Moldova is a piece of land 
which borders the Danube River. A new terminal is planned for the area, and the 
agreement will allow Moldova easy access to the Black Sea via the river, 
bypassing Romania and Ukraine, for trade to and from Russia. In exchange, 
Moldova gave up a section of road near the village of Palanca, which will now 
complete the transportation route between the Ukrainian cities Odessa and 
Ismail that was interrupted by the border. (Intelnews, 0653 GMT, 6 Aug 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-218) However, Moldovan Prime Minister Ciubuc was criticized by right-
wing nationalists who accused him of ceding national territory to Ukraine. 
(Basapress, 1830 GMT, 7 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-219) Over all, the agreement 
reached by the two premiers was reached without friction, as both sides proved 
willing to cooperate in settling the border dispute which has been going on since 
the creation of the two states. 
 
Transport of nuclear waste debate splits alliance 
The leading alliance in parliament was split on the issue of allowing the 
transportation of nuclear waste from Bulgaria through Moldova. On 31 July, the 
Democratic and Prosperous faction sided with the Communist Party in 
parliament's decision to approve the shipment, which had already been approved 
by Romania and Ukraine. The Democratic Convention and the Party of 
Democratic Forces argued against it, and sided with environmentalists who 
maintained that the shipment could endanger the population's health. 
(Basapress, 1700 GMT, 13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) In spite of the protests by 
environmentalists, who even threatened to block off railroads in order to stop the 
transport, on 12 August the government approved the shipment, in exchange of a 
payment of $50,000 per year and $5 million in case of an emergency. The 
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shipment will take seven hours by train to cross Moldova. (Basapress, 1845 
GMT, 31 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-219) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy and Zviad Gogiashvili 
 
DAGESTAN 
Deja vu in the North Caucasus -- a chronology 
August 2: Russian troops guarding Dagestan's border battled Chechen border 
guards for four hours after the latter provoked a confrontation by trying to secure 
passage for an undocumented person. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 2 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-217) 
 
August 16: Three villages in the Buinak district proclaimed a separate "Islamic 
territory." As their first acts of independence, Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and 
Kadar established a checkpoint, flew a new flag, and shot up a local police post. 
(Interfax, 0945 GMT, 17 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-229) 
 
August 19: A joint session of the State Council and the government was held to 
consider the situation in the separatist villages. 
 
August 20: Shamil Basaev, deputy defense minister of Chechnya, threatened to 
use his battalion against Makhachkala if force were employed against the 
Islamist villages. Russia's ethnic policy minister, Yevgeni Sapiro, said there must 
be a negotiated solution. "We can operate there only by invitation. And if God 
forbid, if we, as the federal center, try to impose our course, this will cause only 
harm. I assess the potential danger of the current situation in this case as just as 
great as Chechnya, absolutely the same, on the same scale." (Radiostansiya 
Ekho Moskvy, 1500 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-232) 
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August 21: The leader of Dagestan's Muslims, Mufti Saidmuhammed-Khadzhi 
Abubakarov, was assassinated. President Boris Yel'tsin sent a telegram to State 
Council Chairman Magomedali Magomedov to express his condolences. (ITAR-
TASS, 1912 GMT, 21 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-233) 
 
August 22: Dagestan's State Council, government, and Security Council met to 
discuss the assassination of the mufti. They called on the law enforcement 
agencies to solve the crime and fight against religious extremism. (ITAR-TASS, 
1948 GMT, 22 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-234) 
 
August 23: The head of the Federal Security Service's public relations center told 
journalists in Moscow that the mufti was killed by religious activists and promised 
a full investigation, saying that the FSB is "functioning and actively working" in 
Dagestan. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 22 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-234) 
 
August 24: An MVD checkpoint in the Gerbeli district was attacked; the agents 
were tied up while masked intruders stole their weapons. (ITAR-TASS, 0402 
GMT, 24 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-236) 
 
August 26: A rally in the town of Kizlyurt which called for the resignation of the 
government moved to Makhachkala. Magomedov interrupted his trip to Buinak 
district to return to the capital. He had been negotiating with the representatives 
of the three separatist villages. (Radiostansiya Ekho Moskvy, 0800 GMT, 26 Aug 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-238) 
 
August 29: As a crowd of 3,000 gathered in a mosque, the Muslim Congress 
called on the government to resign due to its inability to cope with increased 
crime and religious extremism. Magomedov responded that the demands would 
be discussed by the parliament within a month and left open the possibility of 
holding a referendum on the proposal of holding direct popular elections for the 
republican chief executive. (Interfax, 1624 GMT, 29 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-241) 
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GEORGIA 
Another Russian provocation? 
An extremely alarming incident in Georgia's Akhalkalaki region eclipsed 
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian's Tbilisi visit. On 12 August a 
Georgian artillery brigade was supposed to hold joint exercises with the Russian 
troops stationed in the Akhalkalaki region. Armed local Armenians, members of 
the Javakhk movement, confronted the Georgians, halted the soldiers' progress, 
and threatened forceful action. The Georgian commander turned back to the 
base rather than risk igniting another armed conflict. 
 
The Armenian activists enjoy the support of the local Russian military base which 
employs 1,400 Armenian officers, warrant officers, and privates. Fearing that the 
Russian force would support the Armenian paramilitary formation, the Georgian 
side hesitated to provoke a confrontation. 
 
Javakhk lobbies for the creation of an autonomous status for the districts in 
southern Georgia which have a largely Armenian population and border Armenia. 
On 22 August the leader of the movement, Ervan Sherinian, told Kavkasia-Press 
that the group will convene village gatherings throughout the region to adopt an 
appeal to the Georgian authorities in favor of autonomy status: "If our appeal is 
once again disregarded, we will take power into our hands." He also claimed, that 
"the last thing we mean by this is joining the Republic of Armenia." Presumably, 
Sherinian has in mind the sort of maneuver used by the Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh, who claimed independence for the sake of appearances as they 
virtually united with Armenia. 
 
While Javakhk claims that autonomy is needed to protect language and cultural 
rights, Armenians are already uninhibited in the exercise of those rights and their 
specific demands do not concern issues of cultural cohesion. Rather the 
complaints against Georgia -- its refusal to classify the Ottoman deportations and 
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massacres of Armenians in 1915 as "genocide" and the planned construction of 
a railroad to Turkey through the Akhalkalaki region -- belong to the sphere of 
Georgian foreign policy formulation which is unlikely to be affected by an 
autonomy. (Kavkasia-Press, 1440 GMT, 22 Aug 98; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
The governments of Georgia and Armenia tried to minimize the impact of the 
incident. On 18 August President Eduard Shevardnadze avoided immediate 
judgment by calling for the creation of a special investigative commission. On 21 
August, Oskanian and his Georgian counterpart, Irakli Menagherishvili, signed a 
joint declaration which affirmed the principle of respecting each other's 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of inviolable borders. (Georgian 
Radio, 0800 GMT, 20 Aug 98; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; NEXIS) On 
26 August, Armenian President Robert Kocharian told reporters "There are 
forces that would like a problem to arise in relations between Armenia and 
Georgia." He suggested that Georgia needs to resolve the problems in the area 
and offered Armenian assistance. (Snark, 1515 GMT, 26 Aug 98; BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts/ nexis) 
 
Comment 
Zviad Gogiashvili, a senior security expert of the Georgian parliament, wrote to 
the Editorial Digest correspondent about these events. His comments are 
reproduced below. 
 
The organization Javakhk, members of which were allegedly participating in this 
provocation, has existed for several years (actually since Georgia declared its 
independence) and is supported financially and by other means from outside. 
According to a correspondent of the Georgia Newspaper, the commander of 
Georgian troops was informed several times on the way to Akhalkalaki by 
representatives of the above-mentioned organization that in case of further 
advance they would be provoked by Russian troops to armed conflict! 
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Consequently, a new "hot spot" could arise, an even more serious conflict 
between Georgians and Armenians (local and cross-border inhabitants) of 
Akhalkalaki region. The commander decided not to advance and to return to 
Akhaltsikhe. 
 
This fact reflects subterranean processes going on in this region of Georgia, 
which borders Armenia and has a population which is more than 90 percent 
Armenian. Considering the reality that people living here have much closer 
contacts with cross-border Armenian regions and that they use the Russian ruble 
instead of the Georgian currency, it is not very difficult to imagine how little these 
people consider themselves to be "citizens of Georgia" and care about stability in 
Georgia. In addition, some "activists" of Javakhk are appealing to extend the 
borders of the "Great Armenia" to include "historically Armenian territories" (as 
they define Akhalkalaki region) within new borders. Of course, such declarations 
pursue the goal of provoking tension and possibly armed conflict. When such 
conflict originates, it's very difficult for international institutions and, especially, 
the general public to distinguish who's right and who's wrong, who's the offender 
and who's the victim (just like in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). 
Briefly, there are some groups and movements outside of Georgia which support 
and use "activists" of Javakhk and this organization becomes a tool for 
implementing their "friendly" intentions towards Georgia. 
 
To be more specific, I would like to give you an example that reflects a general 
policy of some Armenian politicians and public activists. In July 1996 the National 
Council of Youth (NYC) Organizations of Georgia (at that time I was a member of 
the Presidium of the NYC) hosted a delegation of the NYC of Armenia. Our 
meeting was initiated by the Armenian side and, at their request, we met in 
Tbilisi. We weren't informed in advance in detail about issues on the agenda, just 
told that a meeting was "very important." At the meeting our Armenian colleagues 
proposed to hold a conference that late summer (just before a visit of the 
President Levon Ter-Petrosian to Georgia) on Armenian minority issues in 
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Akhalkalaki. This proposal was made in a manner as if our Armenian colleagues 
were inviting us to the Sevani Lake for a summer holiday, as if they were hosts 
and we were guests. And this delegation was representing the opinion of 
organized youth of Armenia. 
 
I'd like to emphasize that some people in Armenia (regretfully, not only 
representatives of NGOs) hold such an attitude to the Akhalkalaki region that 
doesn't contribute positively to the solution of problems in this region. Moreover, 
it serves as an additional obstacle to a gradual settlement process. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Government takes measures to protect economy against ruble collapse 
On 18 August, Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Nurlan Balgymbaev informed two 
officials from a French bank, Pariba, that, although the Russian administration's 
decision to allow the ruble to drop to 9.5 against the dollar was very troubling, 
Kazakhstan's financial situation was much more stable than Russia's. 
Kazakhstan possesses $2 billion in gold and hard currency reserves, and must 
spend approximately $50 million per month in order to service its foreign and 
domestic debts (Interfax, 1451 GMT, 18 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-230), which 
accounts for 9 percent of the state budget, in contrast to Russia's foreign and 
domestic debt payments, which make up 35 percent of its budget. Furthermore, 
only about 7 percent of Kazakhstan's trade is now conducted in the Russian 
ruble, which should also protect the Kazakh economy from the ruble's recent 
drastic fall in value. (Interfax, 1025 GMT, 19 Aug 98, FBIS-SOV-98-231) 
Nonetheless, the Kazakh government took steps to protect its domestic 
producers, by reducing energy and rail transport tariffs as well as other taxes. 
(Interfax, 1451 GMT, 18 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-230) 
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At a press conference on 20 August, Kadyrzhan Damitov, the chairman of the 
republic's National Bank, reassured the public that the Russian ruble's 
devaluation will not result in a similar devaluation of Kazakhstan's tenge, 
although Russia's financial crisis would probably affect prices in its import and 
export trade with Kazakhstan, which might eventually affect Kazakhstan's overall 
foreign trade market. (Interfax, 0913 GMT, 20 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-232) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Government denies fighting Taliban, transfers blame to Khudoiberdiev 
The Tajik foreign ministry released a statement on 12 August denying Russian 
media reports that Tajik government troops were fighting against the Taliban 
under General 'Abdol Rashid Dostum in the northern alliance (the anti-Taliban 
alliance which General Mas'ud has also joined). The statement further declared 
that the Tajik government opposes any outside intervention in Afghanistan's 
affairs and advocates a peaceful end to the country's civil war. Information to the 
contrary, contained in the media reports, was disseminated by "certain forces to 
play the Tajik card" in the Afghan conflict. After denying that the Tajik 
government is playing a role in Afghanistan's civil war, the foreign ministry 
statement went on to suggest that Col. Mahmud Khudoiberdiev and his 
supporters might be in Afghanistan. (ITAR-TASS, 1315 GMT, 12 Aug 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-224, and Interfax, 1717 GMT, 13 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-225) 
 
Comment 
There is documented evidence in the news media that both the Russian and 
Tajik governments have been funneling aid to the anti-Taliban alliance (the 
northern alliance) since late 1996. Furthermore, the Russian border troops 
stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border have had an agreement with former 
President Rabbani (who is still recognized by many countries, including the 
Russian Federation, as the legitimate Afghan head of state) since early fall 1996 
which allows them to travel 25 km into Afghanistan. This 25-kilometer area has 
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been termed a "security zone" and was originally established to permit Russian 
troops to pursue United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters across the Afghan border 
and to attack UTO camps in northern Afghanistan. 
 
UN recalls all 'non-essential' staff 
In a statement released to the press on 24 August, the UN special envoy to 
Tajikistan, Jan Kubis, announced his decision to evacuate from the country all 
"non-essential" UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) personnel, as 
well as those staff members of other UN agencies which have offices in 
Tajikistan. Kubis also decided to prohibit temporarily any UN-sponsored 
international delegations or personnel from entering Tajikistan, with the exception 
of security personnel or those who are relieving members of the "essential" staff 
as part of the normal staff rotation. The statement emphasized that this action 
was being taken only out of concern for the security of UN personnel in 
Tajikistan, and was not to be interpreted as a political maneuver. Nor does this 
action signify a UN decision to end its observer mission in Tajikistan, but should 
be considered simply as a precautionary measure. (Informatsionnoye Agentstvo 
Ekho Moskvy, 1115 GMT, 24 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-236) 
 
UTO detains three suspects in murder of UNMOT members 
Members of the UTO took three men into custody on 25 August who are 
suspected of having been involved in the murder of four UNMOT employees on 
20 July. The three men were hiding in territory which is still under UTO control. 
Representatives of Tajikistan's National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) 
announced the men's arrest on 27 August, adding that they would be handed 
over to Tajikistan's interior ministry within one or two days. Neither the men's 
identity nor the details of their involvement in the murders were released. (Kyodo 
News Service, 1348 GMT, 27 Aug 98; FBIS-EAS-98-239) 
 
At a press conference in Moscow on 17 August, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister 
Keizo Takemi stated that he had learned that four suspects in the UNMOT 
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members' deaths were hiding in one of Tajikistan's mountainous regions. Minister 
Takemi traveled to Tajikistan at the behest of his own government, in order to 
monitor the murder investigation's progress. He told journalists that he had 
managed to speak with both UTO chairman Said Abdullo Nuri and with 
Tajikistan's Deputy Chairman Abdurakhman Azimov, who is directing the 
investigation. It was Mr. Nuri who informed him of the suspects' whereabouts and 
Deputy Chairman Azimov told him that government authorities had identified the 
four suspects and that the investigation was in its final stages. (Kyodo News 
Service, 0857 GMT, 17 Aug 98; FBIS-EAS-98-230) 
 
UTO troops' repatriation on hold due to delays in murder investigation 
Approximately 200 UTO troops continue to wait in northern Afghanistan for their 
repatriation to Tajikistan. They are to reenter the country via the Nizhnyi Pyandzh 
checkpoint, which is under the jurisdiction of the Pyandzh border guard unit. 
Yusuf Khakimov, the press secretary for the NRC, informed Interfax on 25 
August that the continued delays in the troops' return to Tajikistan are of 
considerable concern to the UTO leadership. The territory where the troops' 
camps are located has fallen under the Taliban's control, which could complicate 
the troops' return home. Khakimov reported that the main reason for the delay in 
the UTO units' repatriation is the UN special envoy's refusal to assist in the 
process until the suspects in the four UNMOT members' murder have been 
arrested and are in the custody of law enforcement officials in Dushanbe. 
Khakimov also announced that UTO chairman Said Abdullo Nuri had ordered the 
opposition units which had detained the suspects to transport them to the capital 
and hand them over to Tajik government authorities. (Interfax, 1018 GMT, 25 
Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-237) 
 
Mayor of Tursunzade killed; Khudoiberdiev's militia blamed 
Five people died and four were injured on 27 August, when 15 masked men 
armed with automatic rifles and at least one submachine gun fired on 
Tursunzade's Mayor Nurullo Khairulloev and his bodyguards outside his offices in 
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the town hall at 6:25 a.m. The guards returned fire, upon which the attackers fled 
toward the Uzbek border in two cars, pursued by the mayor's protectors. The 
mayor's men managed to kill one assailant and wound three others during the 
pursuit, but all 14 managed to escape across the border to Uzbekistan and are 
believed to have sought refuge in the village of Toshtepa. The Uzbek interior 
ministry and border services are reported to have joined in the manhunt. 
(Interfax, 0752 GMT, 27 Aug 98; FBIS-TOT-98-239) 
 
The attacker who was killed during the incident has been identified as a former 
driver for Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiev's brother (in August 1997 Col. 
Khudoiberdiev attacked Dushanbe, was routed and driven across the border into 
Uzbekistan with a group of his supporters; they are still at large today and their 
whereabouts remain undetermined). Based on this evidence, Tajik officials have 
concluded that it was Col. Khudoiberdiev's militia group which was responsible 
for organizing and carrying out the attack on Mayor Khairulloev, according to the 
presidential press secretary, Zafar Saidov. (Interfax, 1354 GMT, 27 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-239) Saidov also stated that the Tajik government believes that 
the attack on the late mayor of Tursunzade (approximately 60 km west of 
Dushanbe) was carried out in order to disrupt the peace process by creating 
social and political instability in that region. About two weeks prior to the assault 
on Mayor Khairulloev, Qalandar Haidarov, the chief administrator of Shahrinaw 
District (sometimes transliterated as Shahr-i Nav, located 30 km west of 
Dushanbe) was attacked and killed. (Interfax, 1002 GMT, 27 Aug 98, FBIS-SOV-
98-239) On 15 August, Haidarov's assailants approached his residence in two 
cars, disarmed his guards, and then drove him out into the street. Local police 
officers found him later, fatally shot. The attackers' identity was unknown and 
investigative officials concluded that Haidarov's murder was the result of gang 
warfare, not committed for political reasons. (ITAR-TASS, 1030 GMT, 16 Aug 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-228) 
 
Comment 
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As of yet, there seems to be little confirmed proof that it was indeed Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's militia group which was responsible for the assassination of 
either Mayor Khairulloev or Qalandar Haidarov -- the fact that the dead man once 
worked as a driver for Col. Khudoiberdiev's brother is circumstantial evidence at 
best. However, considering Khudoiberdiev's ties to Tursunzade (see Editorial 
Digest for January 1997), it is not an unlikely hypothesis that his men were 
involved in one or both incidents. The fact that they fled to Uzbekistan is at least 
as significant as the dead man's identity. If Khudoiberdiev's supporters were 
involved, it raises any number of questions about the motives behind the attacks. 
Khairulloev and Haidarov may have been killed simply to settle old scores, and/or 
because they were not complying with the demands of Col. Khudoiberdiev and 
the members of his group (it is possible that Khudoiberdiev has been relying to 
some extent on Tursunzade for financial and material support, during his now 
year-long exile in Uzbekistan). The murders may have also been a ploy to create 
a power vacuum in that region of Tajikistan, which could be filled by those who 
are still sympathetic toward Khudoiberdiev. In any case, if Col. Khudoiberdiev's 
militia was involved in either of these two attacks, it is a sign that he is still 
actively pursuing his goal of attaining political influence in Tajikistan. Disrupting 
Tajikistan's peace process is probably not one of his main aims; if he is able to 
gain a share in the country's power distribution without damaging the fragile 
peace that has been established, then he might well be satisfied. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Foreign ministry denies that Taliban attacked Turkmen consulate 
Unidentified Turkmen sources reported on 10 August that during their attacks on 
Mazar-e Sharif, the Taliban had forced their way into the Turkmen consulate 
there, looked through documents, and interrogated members of the diplomatic 
staff and drove them out of the building. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
0230 GMT, 11 Aug 98; FBIS-NES-98-223) The Turkmen foreign ministry 
immediately denied these reports and released a quote from Khadzhamurat 
Babaev, the Turkmen Consul-General in Mazar-e Sharif, stating that everything 
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was "business as usual" at the consulate and that diplomatic contacts had been 
set up with Taliban representatives. (Interfax, 1618 GMT, 11 Aug 98, FBIS-SOV-
98-223) 
 
Foreign minister defines position on Afghan conflict, CIS involvement 
Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov informed a press 
conference in Ashgabat on 14 August that his government maintained its 
previous position on the Afghan civil war: It is Afghanistan's internal affair and, 
although it has had a harmful effect not only on Afghanistan, but also on 
neighboring countries, Turkmenistan would only take action to resolve the conflict 
through a UN-sponsored initiative. Furthermore, the Turkmen government has no 
intention of joining CIS efforts to end the conflict and does not feel bound by any 
collective CIS responsibility to intervene in Afghanistan's civil war. The Turkmen 
government will continue to maintain its policy of "positive neutrality," as is set 
out in the Turkmen constitution. (Interfax, 1049 GMT, 14 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
226) 
 
President Niyazov receives Pakistani Minister Kanju 
Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Siddifi Khan Kanju 
arrived in Ashgabat on 25 August after visiting the Uzbek and Tajik capitals, 
where he was shunned by those countries' presidents. (Interfax, 1714 GMT, 25 
Aug 98 FBIS-SOV-98-237) President Niyazov was willing to meet with Minister 
Kanju, however, and received him the following day. The men's two main topics 
of discussion were the Afghan civil war and the Turkmen-Pakistan pipeline 
construction project. Both Minister Kanju and President Niyazov proclaimed their 
desire to see a permanent peace established in Afghanistan. Whether or not the 
Afghan conflict is resolved in the near future, Minister Kanju did not seem to think 
that this should hinder the pipeline's construction schedule. The pipeline is to run 
from Turkmenistan through territory which the Taliban have already controlled for 
some time, to Pakistan. A US company, Unocal, owns a 56-percent share in the 
construction project, and company spokesmen recently announced that Unocal 
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was temporarily withdrawing its support for the project, following the US missile 
attacks on the terrorist camp in Afghanistan. However, both the Pakistani and 
Turkmen governments intend to force Unocal to fulfill its obligations vis-a-vis the 
planned pipeline construction. The Taliban signed documents guaranteeing the 
security of the pipeline route and also the safety of the construction workers last 
June. Minister Kanju added that building the pipeline would also be economically 
beneficial for Afghanistan. (Interfax, 1348 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-238) 
 
Comment 
Although the Pakistani government continues to deny that it is supporting the 
Taliban with military and financial aid (there are even unconfirmed reports that 
Pakistani soldiers are fighting with the Taliban), the evidence is to the contrary. 
There are a number of theories on Pakistan's motives for aiding the Taliban, one 
of which states that both Pakistan and Turkmenistan believe that the Taliban 
forces are those most likely to be able to unite Afghanistan under a stable regime 
which will be friendly toward both the Pakistani and Turkmen governments. Such 
a regime would greatly benefit Pakistan and Turkmenistan economically by 
opening up transportation and trade routes across the region, including a safe 
export route for oil and natural gas. Should the Turkmen-Pakistan pipeline 
construction project ever be completed, other countries in the region would 
probably also be ready and willing to use it to export their own energy supplies, 
regardless of which faction was in control of Kabul. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
All for one, this time 
In direct contrast to their strategy regarding admission to the European Union, 
the three Baltic states have agreed to work out a common regional stance for the 
1999 NATO summit. At a meeting at the end of July in the Lithuanian seaport 
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Klaipeda, Presidents Lennart Meri of Estonia, Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia, and 
Valdus Adamkus of Lithuania decided to develop a coordinated approach to 
members of NATO and the alliance's Partnership for Peace program. (Baltic 
News Service, 1500 GMT, 25 Jul 98) Estonia's invitation by the European Union 
last year to begin membership talks, and the exclusion of Latvia and Lithuania 
from that invitation, had put a definite crimp in relations somewhat between the 
three countries. 
 
The danger lies not within the stars... 
A poll taken in March by the Saar Poll market research company revealed that 
most Baltic residents see their security threatened more by domestic than by 
foreign action. More than 95 percent of respondents ruled out the possibility of 
foreign aggression, which is fortunate given that most doubted the ability of their 
country's defense forces to repel an invasion (Estonia: 76 percent; Latvia: 81 
percent; Lithuania: 72 percent). The disbelief in external danger does not 
translate into feelings of security, however; the percentages of those persons 
polled who see the state threatened from within stood at 62 percent in Latvia, 45 
percent in Lithuania, and 35 percent in Estonia. (Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 
30 Jul 98) Given these attitudes, it may not be surprising to some that Lithuanian 
President Valdus Adamkus sees no problem with allowing troops from Russia 
and other CIS countries to participate in peacekeeping exercises in Lithuania. 
Currently, according to legislation passed (understandably) in 1992, there can be 
no Russian or CIS military bases or units on Lithuanian territory. (Baltic News 
Service, 1000 GMT, 28 Jul 98) 
 
The media may have quite a lot to do with the belief that danger rests within the 
borders, by both reporting and perhaps inciting distrust (and, on occasion, acts 
against the state). A recent study of the post-Soviet press in Latvia found that the 
newspapers in effect encourage division of society by the topics they cover and 
the manner in which they do so. Scholars Ilza Shuman and Sergei Kruk reported 
that the differences between Russian- and Latvian-language newspapers has 
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become so great that a further division of the communities of readers has been 
created. Latvian- and Russian-language publications cover subjects of interest to 
their readership, often to the exclusion of other subjects, thereby increasing a 
sense of isolation in the communities they serve. (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 Aug 98) 
 
While some media may be sparking tinders of dissension inadvertently, others 
are quite intentionally fanning flames. In a move designed to counteract the more 
belligerent media, the Lithuanian government has approved amendments to the 
law on mass media that would expand the functions of the Journalists' and 
Publishers' Ethics Commission, to analyze and offer conclusions on the 
instigation of military, ethnic, racial or religious discord in the mass media. Ethnic 
minorities reportedly have been complaining about media information and 
comments that are seen as instigating conflict. (Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 
31 Jul 98) 
 
Some organizations don't need any help from the media, however. The leader of 
the radical group Perkonkrusts was detained by Latvian security police at the end 
of July. According to the interior ministry, charges against 70-year-old Vilis Linins 
included intentional damage of property performed in a dangerous manner, and 
illegal possession and transportation of explosives. Linins, who was reportedly 
thrown out of the Aizsargi organization for his over-radical views, was described 
as the ideological leader of Perkonkrusts. According to testimony by previously 
detained members of the group, Linins had been trying to convince other 
Perkonkrusts members that the country's railways should be blown up to prevent 
the export of timber, considered to be "Latvian gold." (Baltic News Service, 1000 
GMT, 29 Jul 98) 
 
In Lithuania, the director of the Lithuanian State Security Department, Mecys 
Laurinkus, is concerned primarily with the activities of Russian intelligence. The 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR), Federal Security Service (FSB) 
and military intelligence (GRU) "are resuming their activities in the Baltic 
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countries, stepping up their operation and, clearly, using new techniques," 
Laurinkus said in an interview with the Respublika newspaper. (Interfax, 0737 
GMT, 3 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-219) Laurinkus also said the services are seeking 
recruits, and warned that the entourages of high-ranking officials were in danger 
of infiltration. (Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 3 Aug 98) It is unclear how 
reassured Laurinkus et al. were upon hearing from SVRR spokeswoman Tatiana 
Samolis that such claims of increased intelligence activity were "unfounded." 
(Interfax, 0825 GMT, 4 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-220) 
 
LATVIA 
Government begins unilateral border demarcation 
While many Baltic citizens view as unlikely an invasion from without, that 
perception hasn't stopped Latvia from beginning unilateral demarcation of its 
border with Russia. According to Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs, the move 
follows a stalemate in talks with Russia on establishing and modernizing the 
border. (NTV, 0600 GMT, 31 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-217) Birkavs sees the 
strengthening of the country's border as the last step on Latvia's path to the 
European Union, he said in a ceremony at the Rezekne border guard school. 
(Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 30 Jul 98) While Birkavs stated his belief that 
relations with Russia would improve once the border issue was settled, Russian 
foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin gave quite different signals. The 
dialogue between the two countries on the situation will continue, Rakhmanin 
said, once Latvia ends its unilateral demarcation and settles problems of its 
Russian-speaking population in keeping with international norms (see previous 
Digest for a discussion on this mantra). (Baltic News Service, 1800 GMT, 3 Aug 
98) Claiming that "the border is confidence," Birkavs rejected Russia's appeal to 
end the demarcation efforts. (Baltic News Service, 1800 GMT, 4 Aug 98) An 
interview with the director of Russia's Federal Border Service, Nikolai Bordyuzha, 
offered a glimpse into what may be prodding the Latvian side into action: 
Bordyuzha explained that the Russian guards are increasing their forces on the 
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Russian-Latvian border as part of the program to develop border facilities. (ITAR-
TASS, 1555 GMT, 6 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-218) 
 
ESTONIA 
Funds for waterworks project evaporate 
Water problems continue to rain down upon the Russian town of Ivangorod, 
following a decision by its Estonian water supplier, AS Narva Vesi, to cut service 
by 75 percent on 13 July (see previous Digest). Baltic News Service (1800 GMT, 
27 Jul 98) reported that the town could not pay its water debt because no money 
has been allocated for this purpose in the Leningrad Oblast budget. Moreover, 
although there are plans for the town to build its own waterworks, Ivangorod 
received less than 22 percent of the needed 9.2 million rubles for the project, 
according to presidential representative Vladimir Shemyakin. 
 
The oblast government eventually managed to find some money to offset the 
debt, but it was a case of too little, too late. AS Narva Vesi financial director Teet 
Rist explained that, despite a bank transfer of 1.1 million kroons made on 30 
July, the water supply would be restored to normal levels only after the entire 
debt was paid. Ivangorod Mayor Pavel Grigoriev said the Leningrad Oblast 
administration promised to discuss opportunities for further payment of the debt. 
(Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 30 Jul 98 
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